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mon law and exploit his work without endangering his exclusivity.
Furthermore, the longer period of protection will make the federal
statutory protection more appealing to authors. 5
While the public clearly benefits from the eventual release of
all literary works into the public domain, one aspect of such a
scheme is subject to severe criticism-the release of private papers
and manuscripts. While it is true that after a sufficient period
of time following an author's death the importance of privacy
may decline, there is definitely a strong interest in the individual's
right to protect his private work from the peering eye of the
general public. There is a real danger that many documents such
as private correspondence and diaries, will be destroyed, although
this could be overcome by the retention of such works in libraries
or archives, available to scholars, but removed from the grasp of
the general public.66
One advantageous change which will result from the new
system is that all causes of action involving copyright protection
under the new law will be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts 6 7 thus minimizing the conflicts between court interpretations of the statute.
It seems, in conclusion, that the benefits to be derived from
the proposed scheme of protection greatly outweigh its shortcomings. After too long a wait, the United States seems prepared to equip itself with copyright legislation capable of meeting
the needs of our technologically advanced society.

X
TH E EFFECT OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AWARDS ON RECOVERY UNDER MVAIC

The Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation Law'
was enacted in 1958 to remedy the failure of New York's then
existing financial responsibility laws 2 to protect the innocent
05Under PRoi'osED LAw § 304(a) the time of renewal is extended from
28 to 47 years for those works which are in their first term of copyright
protection when the statute becomes effective.

16 Such a system was urged by the Register.
67 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1964).

REGisTza's REPoRT

1241.

(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the
courts of the states in patent and copyright cases.
' N.Y. Ixs. LAw art. 17-A [hereinafter referred to as MVAIC].
2N.Y. VEHiCLE & TRAgiC LAW art. 6 (Motor Vehicle Financial
Security Act of 1956); N.Y. VEHIcLE & TRAmc LAW art. 7 (Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of 1929).
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victims of the uninsured and financially irresponsible motorist
and the unknown hit-and-run driver." MVAIC is a non-profit
corporation4 "designed to afford a person injured [by an uninsured
motorist] . . .the same protection as he would have had had he
been injured in an accident caused by an identifiable automobile
covered by a standard 5 automobile liability insurance policy. . . ." 6
Under MVAIC, persons injured by uninsured motor vehicles are
divided into two categories. The predominant category is that of
the "insured" person, who is defined and whose rights are
governed by the New York Accident Indemnification Endorsement
[hereinafter referred to as the Endorsement] drafted by MVAIC
and required by law in every automobile liability insurance policy
issued in New York.7 An "insured" person is defined under the
Endorsement to include the policy holder, his spouse, relatives
of either while residents of his household, and any persons lawfully
using or occupying a motor vehicle owned or driven by the
policy holder."
The second category consists of the "qualified" person, that is,
anyone not an "insured" person within the scope of the EndorsesSee generally Ward, New York's Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corpordlion: Past, Present and Future, 8 B=irALo L. REv. 215 (1959);
Note. The Financially Irresponsible Motorist-New York's MVAIC, 65
CoLum. L. REv. 1075 (1965); Note, MVAIC Six Years Later-A Practical
Appraisal, 39 ST. JoHN's L. REv . 321 (1965).
4
N.Y. Iqs. LAW § 602.
5
Under N.Y. VEslcLn & T vAmc LAW § 311(4) (a), a standard
"owner's policy of liability insurance" is one which provides, inter alia,
insurance against loss from liability for damages because of bodily injury
to or death of any person arising out of ownership, use, operation oir
maintenance of a motor vehicle in New York or elsewhere in the United
States or Canada subject to a limit of $10,000 for injury or death of
one person, and $20,000 for death or injury of two or more persons in
any one accident (footnote supplied).
GMcCarthy v. MVAIC, 16 App. Div. 2d 35, 38, 224 N.Y.S2d 909,
913 (4th Dep't 1962), af'd, 12 N.Y.2d 922, 188 N.E.2d 405, 238 N.Y.S.
2d 101 (1963). The legislature intended the MVAIC program to operate
where an accident is caused by the following categories of motor vehicles:
(1)uninsured, (2) unidentified, (3) registered in New York but for which
a liability insurance policy was not in effect at the time of the accident
(4) stolen, (5) operated without the permission of the owner, (6) subject
to disclaimer or denial of coverage by the insurer, or (7) unregistered.
N.Y. INs. LAW § 600 (2).
7N.Y. Ixs. LAW § 167-2a. The statute provides that the insurer will
pay sums to which the "insured" is entitled "subject to the terms and
conditions

[in the Endorsement]

. . . to be prescribed by the board of

directors" of MVAIC and approved by the Superintendent of Insurance.
Also, any liability insurance p6licy failing to contain the Endorsement
shall be construed as if it embodied the required uninsured motorist
coverage. Ibid.
8 See Endorsement, Definitions.
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ment definition who is a resident of New York State (except the
owner of an uninsured motor vehicle or a spouse while a
passenger in such vehicle) or who is a resident of a state with
similar uninsured motorist legislation.9
It should be noted that under the original MVAIC statute,
both categories of persons were entitled to recover from MVAIC
itself. The legislative intent, i.e., that one injured by an uninsured
driver receive the same benefits as one injured by a party with
minimum insurance coverage and no other assets, initially applied
to all persons covered by MVAIC. In 1965, the legislature, seeking to facilitate the administration of claims, amended the statute
to allow the "insured" person to proceed directly against his
own insurance company in arbitration. ° This change was merely
procedural, there being no intention to create a distinction between
coverage available to "insured" or "qualified" persons. 1
Where a person who happens to be acting in the course of
his employment is injured by an uninsured motorist, a situation
arises wherein the injured party may be entitled to recover under
the Workmen's Compensation Law.1 2 In addition, he may be
entitled to recover from his insurer as an "insured" under an
Endorsement or from MVAIC itself as a "qualified" person.
However, MVAIC, in drafting the Endorsement, has provided
that any amount payable by the insurer thereunder to an "insured"
"shall be reduced by . . . (4) the amount paid and present value
of all amounts payable on account of such bodily injury under
any workmen's compensation law, exclusive of non-occupational
disability benefits. 113 Nowhere in the statute is MVAIC expressly
9 N.Y. INs. LAw § 601 (b). The "qualified" person's remedy is to
notify MIVAIC of the accident and bring an action against the uninsured.
After obtaining a judgment which remains unsatisfied, he seeks payment
from MVAIC through filing a petition in the court which granted judgment.
N.Y. Ixs. LAw §§ 608, 610.

10An "insured" person's remedy under the Endorsement where the in-

surer "and "insured" fail to agree on the amount of recovery is an
arbitration proceeding upon the issues of fault and damages. See Note,
MVAIC Six Years Later-A Practical Appraisal, supra note 3, at 335-37.
121965 Isurance Legislation, N.Y. LFs. ANNUAL 381 (1965). 'We
would emphasize that this bill takes nothing away and does not reduce
any coverage." Id. at 382.
"2 Ordinarily, where an employee is injured or killed by one in the
same employ, his exclusive remedy is the right to workmen's compensation
benefits. N.Y. WORKMEN'S Comp. LAW §29 (6). However, where the
employee is injured by one not in the same employ, he may take his
compensation benefits and also sue the tort-feasor. N.Y. WoRxME's ComP.
LAw § 29 (1).
13Endorsement Condition 5, limits of liability. Also deducted are:
(1) the amounts paid by an owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle and (2) amounts received under any similar uninsured motorist
insurance.
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empowered to provide for deduction of a workmen's compensation
award from the "insured" person's MVAIC recovery. Furthermore, workmen's compensation benefits are not deducted from an
14
MVAIC award received by a "qualified" person under the statute.'
It is the purpose of this note to investigate the apparent
inequality of treatment by MVAIC of "insured" and "qualified"
persons with respect to workmen's compensation benefits and to
determine whether the deduction contained in the Endorsement is
(1) a valid exercise of administrative power and (2) an appropriate method for the effectuation of the legislative intent underlying MVAIC.
The New York Controversy
The lack of specific statutory authorization for the deduction
of a workmen's compensation award from an "insured" person's
recovery, the absence of such reduction in the case of a "qualified"
person, coupled with the fact that where one is injured by an
insured motorist, the defendant's insurer may not reduce the
judgment by workmen's compensation received by the plaintiff,
has led to a questioning of MVAIC's power to write such an
Endorsement.
In Matter of Durant v. MVAIC, the appellate division refused
to reduce an "insured" person's award by the amount of benefits
received under workmen's compensation for the same accident.15
Emphasizing the apparently unequal treatment afforded the
"insured," the court stated that
the power delegated to MVAIC [is] . .. confined to the drafting of an
endorsement which carries out the spirit and intent of the statute.
That power cannot be enlarged unilaterally by MVAIC arrogating to
itself the prerogative to debase the insured person's right of recovery
in contrast to the same right granted to a qualified person. Any such
enlargement would frustrate the uniformity of treatment of injured
persons intended by the Legislature and would perpetrate an in6
equity ....
Thus, it was stated that if a workmen's compensation award
were to be deducted from the recovery, specific authority should
have been provided in the statute. 7 Furthermore, the court felt
14A "qualified" person's award may be reduced in amount by: (1) any
other valid and collectible liability insurance or assets of the uninsured
motorist and (2) any settlement received by the "qualified" person from
any other person liable. N.Y. INs. LAW § 610.
1520 App. Div. 2d 242, 246 N.Y.S.2d 548 (2d Dep't 1964), modified,
15 N.Y.2d 408, 207 N.E.2d 600, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965).

16 20 App. Div. 2d at 246, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 553.

17

Id. at 247, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
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that such a deduction would frustrate the statutory scheme of
the workmen's compensation law by removing the right of the
The argucompensation insurance carrier to its statutory lien.'
ment that the workman would be allowed a double recovery was
rejected by the court for two reasons: first, the compensation
carrier had a lien for reimbursement of the amount of workmen's
compensation benefits received and, second, the workman's actual
damage had been found to be greater than the combined amounts
of his MVAIC Endorsement and workmen's compensation awards.
It was thus concluded that the deduction provision was unenforceable.
The New York Court of Appeals modified the appellate
division's decision, reasoning that MVAIC was authorized by
statute to draft the Endorsement while dismissing as immaterial
the fact that a "qualified" person would not have had an award
reduced by compensation payments.' 9 Thus, under the decision
in Durant, MVAIC can authorize the insurer to reduce its awards
the "insured" receives
under the Endorsement by any amounts
20
as workmen's compensation benefits.
The Experieiwe of Other Jurisdictions
A survey of uninsured motorist statutes in jurisdictions other
than New York reveals that legislatures generally have merely
formulated broad guidelines for administrative agencies and have
not set out precisely what the uninsured motorist endorsement
should contain.21 Only two states were found to have statutes
expressly treating workmen's compensation recovery in a manner
similar to New York's MVAIC Endorsement. In New Jersey,
to state a cause of action under the Unsatisfied Claim and
Judgment Fund Law, a person must prove that he is not covered
by workmen's compensation with respect to the accident 2 Closest
Is The compensation carrier has either a lien, to the extent it has
paid the injured party, on the proceeds of any third-party action after

reasonable attorney's fees, or an assignment of the right to bring a
third-party action, if none has been brought. N.Y. Wo=xEMns Comn'. LAW
§ 29 (1)-(2).
19 Matter of Durant (MVAIC), 15 N.Y.2d 408, 207 N.E.2d 600, 260

N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965).
Cruzado (MVAIC), 24 App. Div. 2d 743, 263
20 See Matter of
484 (1st Dep't 1965) (memorandum decision).
N.Y.S.2d
2
STAT. ch.
. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.0351 (Supp. 1966); ILL. Am.
73, § 755a (Smith-Hurd 1965); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 46-750.14 (1962).
See Lewis v. Engelhardt,
22 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-70 (Supp. 1966).
79 N.J. Super. 171, 191 A.2d 75 (1963); Minardi v. Nocito, 66 N.J.
Super. 187, 168 A.2d 825 (1961). In contrast the Virginia uninsured
motorist statute appears to expressly prohibit such reduction. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.1-381 (Supp. 1966). The Virginia statute was amended in 1960 as
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to New York in its treatment of workmen's compensation benefits
under uninsured motorist coverage is California. Under the
California statute, recovery is reduced by the amount the
23
claimant is entitled to receive as workmen's compensation.
Although, prior to a 1961 amendment, no provision for such a
deduction appeared in the statute, the Attorney General of California nevertheless upheld the validity of such a provision, commonly used by California liability insurers. 24
Other jurisdictions with statutes similar to those of New
York and California (prior to the 1961 amendment), where there
is no express statutory authority, have not allowed the deduction.
In Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Gavin,2 5 a Florida appellate
court was faced with the question of whether an insurer could
provide for a workmen's compensation deduction in an uninsured
motorist endorsement required by statute. There was no Florida
precedent available and when confronted with the New York Court
of Appeals' decision in Durant, the court expressly rejected the
New York position and stated that because of the established public
policy of the state that every insured be entitled to recover as if
the offending motorist had maintained a policy of liability insurance,
"insurance companies are without power to insert provisions in
the policy which would restrict the coverage
. . . in a manner
'26

contrary to the intent of the statute.
Maryland similarly rejected an attempt to reduce an uninsured
motorist claim by the sum recovered as workmen's compensation
in Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd. v. Salvo.2 7 The court
found that recovery of workmen's compensation was not included
within the express statutory deductions for amounts received in
payment of a judgment, nor was it based on a cause of action for
damages arising out of the same accident. It was concluded that,
absent express statutory authority, no deduction could be made.
In the absence of express statutory language authorizing
reduction of uninsured motorist insurance awards by the amount
follows: "'[B]ut no provision or application of this section shall be
construed to limit the liability of the insurance company, insuring motor
vehicles, to an employee or other insured under this section who is injured
by an uninsured motor vehicle."
It has been said that the amendment
"denies the insurer the right to reduce amounts payable under the policy
by amounts which its insured can collect from a compensation carrier . . . "
Note, Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Virginia, 47 VA. L. REv. 145,
171-72 (1961).
23 CAL. INS. CoDE § 11580.2 (g) (1).
24
See Comment, Uninsured Motorist Insurance: Californias Latest

Answer to the Problem of the Financially Irresponsible Motorist, 48
CALm. L. REv. 516, 529 (1960).
25

184 So. 2d 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).

261d. at 232.
27231 Md. 262, 189 A.2d 638 (1963).
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of workmen's compensation benefits an injured party receives,
conflicting inferences have been drawn as to the power of an
administrative agency to order such a reduction. It is submitted
that the crux of the problem of whether such a deduction is consistent with, and in furtherance of, uninsured motorist protection
depends less upon the cash award obtained from the MVAIC
type agency alone than it does upon the equality of the ultimate
recovery available to all classes of persons injured by uninsured
motorists. Equality of recovery, where workmen's compensation
is present, in turn seems largely to depend upon the extent to
which the compensation carrier can assert its customary statutory
lien upon the injured party's recovery from third parties, and it
is to this problem that the inquiry must now turn.
Subrogation Rights of the Workmen's Compensation
Carrier Against MVAIC
Where an employee is injured by an insured tort-feasor, the
tort-feasor's liability insurer must respect the compensation carrier's
subrogation rights, and the final recovery of the employee from
the tort-feasor's insurer will be reduced by the amount the
compensation carrier has paid him, less reasonable attorney's fees,2
if such were incurred. But, where the employee is the victim of
an uninsured motorist and seeks recovery from the insurer under
an MVAIC Endorsement, a question arises as to the right of the
compensation carrier to assert its statutory lien on the MVAIC
award. In fact, the MVAIC Endorsement contains a provision
purporting to prevent any recovery from inuring to the benefit
of the workmen's compensation carrier. 29 However, in Durant,
the appellate division ignored this provision and assumed the
existence of such a lien upon the proceeds of an "insured"
person's recovery. Unfortunately, this issue was not discussed by
the Court of Appeals. No case has been found in New York
since the enactment of MVAIC deciding the precise question of
whether a workmen's compensation carrier can assert a statutory
lien on recovery under an Endorsement. The case of Commis0
sioners of State Insurance Fund v. Miller,"
decided before the
enactment of the MVAIC law, held that the workmen's compensation carrier has no statutory lien upon the recovery of an employee
2

N.Y. WoRmKEN's ComP. LAw § 29 (1).
"This endorsement does not
Endorsement, Exclusions, provides:
apply . . . (c) so as to inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any
workmen's compensation or disability benefits carrier or any . . . organization qualifying as a self-insurer under any workmen's compensation or
disability benefits law or any similar law."
304 App. Div. 2d 481, 166 N.Y.S.2d 777 (1st Dep't 1957).
8

29
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under his own bargained-for uninsured motorist endorsement.
In that case, the employee had claimed against his own liability
insurer under the uninsured driver provision of his own policy
for which he had paid an additional premium. The insurance
company paid the award and the workmen's compensation carrier
asserted a lien on the proceeds under Section 29 of the New
York Workmen's Compensation Law. Rejecting the carrier's
contention that the lien could not be affected by the provisions
of the insurance contract, the court found that recovery under
an uninsured motorist endorsement was not a source contemplated
by the workmen's compensation law as subject to the statutory lien.
Although the statute provided that an employee injured by the
negligence of another may pursue his remedies against the tortfeasor, with the compensation carrier being afforded a lien on the
proceeds, here the employee had not pursued his remedy. Rather,
the payment he had received was from his own insurer.
The court also discarded the argument that the employee's
insurer had agreed to stand in place of the tort-feasor, maintaining
that the insurer "cannot be deemed the alter ego of the tort-feasor.
It does not insure the tort-feasor against liability; it insures its
policyholder against the risk of inadequate compensation . . .31
The insurer's liability to the employee is contractual, based on
the contingency of a third party's tort liability, and was not meant
to supplement the compensation carrier's statutory lien. Nor was
the compensation carrier intended to become a third-party beneficiary
of the contract.
Since Miller was decided prior to the enactment of the
MVAIC program, the factual context there might well be distinguished from a proceeding under today's Endorsement. There
is some indication that the legislature intended that MVAIC
stand in the shoes of the uninsured tort-feasor.32 Furthermore,
the contractual nature of the insurance coverage in the Miller
case is not quite paralleled under the Endorsement. There, the
insured was free to choose whether to provide his own uninsured
motorist protection by negotiating a contract with his insurer
and paying an extra premium. Today, although the "insured"
pays for his Endorsement, the payment is not voluntary, but
rather part of a compulsory scheme. "The endorsement is not
,, 33
a private contract, fully negotiated by carrier and insured ....

311d. at 482, 166 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
32Bohlinger, 1958 Inmsrance Legislation, N.Y. LEais. ANNuAL 245
(1958).

s3Matter of Durant v. MVAIC, 20 App. Div. 2d 242, 247, 246 N.Y.S.2d
548, 553 (2d Dep't 1964), modified, 15 N.Y.2d 408, 207 N.E.2d 600, 260
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965).
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Thus, the Miller rationale need not prevent the imposition of a
workmen's compensation lien upon Endorsement recovery.
However, the Miller position was applied by the high court
34
of Virginia in Home v.Superior Life Ins. Co., a decision under
the Virginia uninsured motorist statute. There, the court held
that the right of subrogation against "any other party" provided
by the workmen's compensation statute did not include rights
against
the insurer under a required uninsured motorist endorse35
ment.

It should be noted that the insurance policies in both Miller
and Horne contained a clause identical to the one found in the
MVAIC Endorsement providing that an award should not inure
to the benefit of a workmen's compensation carrier. In California,
such a provision appears in the uninsured motorist statute3 and
in all uninsured motorist endorsements. It has been suggested
that, even absent the language in the statute and insurance policies,
uninsured motorist recovery would never inure to the benefit
of the workmen's compensation carrier.3 7 The validity of this
viewpoint has never been tested because of the express statutory
language.
In New York, the presence in the MVAIC Endorsement of
a clause stating that any recovery thereunder shall not inure to
the benefit of any workmen's compensation carrier would seem
to preclude the imposition of a lien on an "insured" person's
award, unless the administrative determination to include such a
clause could be shown to be unreasonable. Moreover, although
this issue was not squarely decided by the Court of Appeals,
its holding in Durant allowing the deduction of workmen's compensation from Endorsement awards tends to establish that, at
present, a lien could not be placed upon an "insured's" recovery.
Not only would the deduction render the lien of little actual value,
but imposing the lien in conjunction with the deduction would
frustrate the public policy behind the act, i.e., to give the "insured"
person the same protection as one injured by an automobile
covered by a standard liability policy. The "insured" person's
Va. 282, 123 S.E.2d 401 (1962).
35 Id.at 286, 123 S.E.2d at 404. It should be noted that the plaintiff
in Home had already collected under his uninsured motorist endorsement
and was claiming workmen's compensation benefits, half of which he had
34203

agreed to remit to his endorsement insurer. Rejecting the argument of double
recovery made by defendant carrier, the court stated: "[plaintiff's] settlement

was with his own insurance carrier, who had contracted to pay him for
injuries under the uninsured motorist provision. .

.

. Under these circum-

stances, a prosecution of his claim for compensation benefits would not
amount to a double recovery .. ." Id. at 288, 123 S.E.2d at 405.
36 CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (c) (4).
3 See supra note 24.
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award would first be reduced by the amount of the compensation
award, and would further be subject to the carrier's lien, whereas
the recovery of a person injured by an insured motor vehicle
could only be reduced by the lien of the compensation carrier.
Also, the Durant holding does not touch upon the question
of whether the recovery of a workman as a "qualified" person
under the MVAIC law is subject to a compensation carrier's
lien. It may be argued that, since Miller emphasized the contractual nature of the "insured" person's recovery under an
endorsement, the rationale for granting immunity from a statutory
lien is not applicable in the case of a "qualified" person whose right
to recovery depends solely upon statute.38 The availability of a
statutory lien would seem to depend upon whether an MVAIC
award to a "qualified" person is a recovery from a third party
within the contemplation of Section 29 of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law.
Although it may be contended that the insurer under the
MVAIC Endorsement insures the injured party, not the tortfeasor, and therefore is not the alter ego of the wrongdoer, this
argument has less force in the case of a "qualified" person. Since
the "qualified" person's remedy is against MVAIC directly under
statute and not against the insurer under the Endorsement, his
rights are clearly not contractual in nature. The State, through
MVAIC, gratuitously provides the "qualified" person with minimum
insurance protection where none would ordinarily exist. Hence,
MVAIC seems to have been placed in the position of the thirdparty tort-feasor. In fact, as previously noted, there is language
in the legislative history of the original statute to the effect that
MVAIC stands in the shoes of the uninsured party. 9 No workmen's compensation lien was provided for in the statute which
governs the rights of the "qualified" person, but the legislature
might well have assumed the existence of such a lien and deemed
it unnecessary to include it in the statute. Thus, it appears that,
if confronted with the question of whether a "qualified" person's
recovery under the MVAIC statute is subject to the statutory
workmen's compensation lien, a court in New York could well
be justified in imposing such a lien after payment of attorney's
fees, thus treating the "qualified" person as if he had been injured
by and recovered from an insured driver. The "qualified" person's
ultimate recovery would be reduced and the compensation carrier
allowed to recoup most of its loss. However, whether this conclusion will be reached remains an open question.
38

See 15 BUFFALO L. R-v. 736, 741 (1966).
1 Supra note 32.
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Equality of Recovery?
While it is clear that a workmen's compensation lien is
applicable to recovery by an employee from an insured tort-feasor,
it appears that such a lien cannot, at present, apply to an "insured"
employee's recovery under the Endorsement. In contrast, there
appears to be a sound basis for imposing such a lien where the
employee recovers from MVAIC as a "qualified" person. Even
more force is given to the argument in favor of imposing a lien
on the "qualified" person's recovery when it is seen that, assuming
the absence of attorney's fees from the picture, such a lien under
the existing statutory framework would promote a basic equality
The initially larger recovery of the victim
of ultimate recovery 4
40

All statements made in the text are illustrated in the charts.

Chart

A assumes the following: (1) the compensation carrier has paid the injured
party $4,000; (2) the most the claimant can recover from parties who
are liable, or who have assumed liability for the injury, is $10,000; (3) no
attorney's fees are incurred in pursuing the remedy against the insured
tort-feasor, the MVAIC Endorsement insurer or MVAIC under the statute.
Although assumption (2) will not be valid in many cases where the
tort-feasor is insured since other assets may be available, the $10,000
limitation %vill exist in each case where an "insured" or "qualified" person
seeks recovery. Thus, since it is within the $10,000 limitation that the
legislature intended MVAIC to operate, equality of recovery must be
measured with that limitation present. Also, it is assumed that for a
given injury, the workmen's compensation award will be a constant, and
that since the compensation board sets attorney's fees under Section 24
of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law, the attorney's fee incurred in obtaining a given award will also be a constant. Thus, the effect
of attorney's fees on the compensation award need not be considered for
purposes of measuring equality of ultimate recovery for the claimant's
injury.
CHART A

(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

"qualified"
"insured"
person
person
wilien
willm & deduction

(E)
"qiudifiec"
person
w/o lien

victim of
inmred
motorist

"insured"
person
w/o lien

(1)
(2)

10,000
none

10,000
4,000

10,000
4,000

10,000
none

10,000
none

(3)
(4)

10,000
4,000

6,000
none

6,000
4,000

10,000
4,000

10,000
none

(5)

6,00

6,000

2,000

6,000

10,000

4,000

4,000

4,000

4,000

4,000

(6)

10,000
14,000
6,000
10,000
10,000
(7)
(1) Award collectible from insured tort-feasor, under MVAIC Endorsement, or under MiVAIC statute before exclusion or limitation.
(2) Amount deducted under Endorsement exclusion of workmen's compensation benefits.
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of the driver insured by a standard liability policy and the
"qualified" person under MVAIC, as compared to the "insured"
person's recovery under the Endorsement, is offset by the statutory
lien of the workmen's compensation carrier, while the absence of
that lien on the "insured's" award counterbalances the initial
reduction of his award, placing him in an equal position with the
other two classes of claimants. 4 ' However, were the carrier's
lien imposed upon the "insured's" recovery at the same time it
is subject to a workmen's compensation deduction, the "insured"
person's retained cash award would be substantially smaller than
he would receive were the tort-feasor insured by a standard liability
policy.4

2

At this point,

it is obvious that

if the workmen's

compensation lien were held inapplicable to the "qualified" person's
recovery, he would be in a far superior position, receiving both
compensation awards without any
the MVAIC and workmen's 43
offsetting of one by the other.
To the extent that the MVAIC Endorsement provision authorizing reduction of all awards by the amounts of workmen's
compensation paid the "insured" offsets the lack of a workmen's
compensation lien on Endorsement recovery under existing law,
it promotes the legislative purpose of placing a person injured
by an uninsured motorist in as good a position as a person
injured by a motorist insured by a standard liability insurance
policy. Thus, it may be concluded that the deduction has "a
rational basis" and is a valid exercise of administrative power
by MVAIC, even absent express legislative authorization for it.
However, it is submitted that the deduction of workmen's compensation benefits as a means of equalizing recovery among "uninsured" persons, "qualified" persons and persons injured by
insured motorists is an imperfect device at best, and fails to solve
several problems.
The first of these problems is raised by the effect of attorney's
fees upon ultimate recovery by the injured party. It is assumed
that a one-third contingent fee will be deemed a reasonable fee
for pursuing the remedy against either the insured tort-feasor,
(3) Initial cash award from insured tort-feasor, under MVAIC Endorsement, or under MVAIC statute.
(4) Amount subject to statutory workmen's compensation carrier's lien.
N.Y. WORKMEN'S Comp. LAW § 29 (1).
(5) Incremental recovery obtained (after imposition of carrier's lien where
applicable).
Workmen's compensation award.
Recovery retained by claimant as compensation for his injuries after

(6)
(7)

all deductions and limitations.

Chart A, supra note 40. Compare cols. (A), (B) & (D).
Id. Compare cols. (A) & (C).
43 Id. Col. (E).
41

4
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the Endorsement insurer, or MVAIC under the statute. It is
submitted that the existence of this fee and its varied effect on
recoveries from a tort-feasor's liability insurer, under MVAIC as
an "insured" person or as a "qualified" person, effectively eliminates
the equality
of ultimate recovery among the several classes of
44
claimants.
44

Chart B assumes facts similar to Chart A, i.e., a workmen's com-

pensation award of $4,000 and a $10,000 limitation on other recovery for

the injury. However, it is here assumed that an attorney's services are
required to pursue the claimant's remedy against the insured tort-feasor,
the MVAIC Endorsement insurer or MVAIC under statute. For purposes of measuring equality of ultimate recovery under the present MVAIC
program it is assumed that a reasonable attorney's fee will be set at onethird of the proceeds received from the insured tort-feasor, the MVAIC
Endorsement insurer, or MVAIC itself. As in Chart A, supra note 40,
it will be unnecessary to consider the effect of the attorney's fee incurred
in obtaining the compensation award.
(A)
victim of
insured

CHART B
(C)

(D)

inotorist

(B)
"insured"
person
W/o lien

(1)
(2)

0,000o
none

10,000
4,000

10,000
4,000

10,000
none

10,000
none

(3)
(4)

10,000
(3,333)*

(2,000)

6,000

6,000
(2,000)

10,000
(3,333)*

10,000
(3,333)*

(5)
(6)

6,667
4,000

4,00
none

4,000
4,000

(7)

2,667

(8)

4,000

4,000
4,000

-04,000

6,667
4,000
2,667
4,000

6,667
none
6,667
4,000

(9)

6,667

8,000

4,000

6,667

10,667

"insured"
"qualified"
person
Person
w/lien & deduction
w/lien

(E)
"qualified"
person
w/o lien

* Rounded to the nearest dollar.

(1) Award collectible from insured tort-feasor, under MVAIC Endorsement, or under MIVAIC statute before exclusion or limitation.
(2) Amount deducted under Endorsement exclusion of workmen's compensation benefits.
(3) Initial cash award from insured tort-feasor, under MVAIC Endorsement, or under MVAIC statute.
(4) Attorney's one-third contingent fee-deducted from (3).
(5) Initial recovery after attorney's fee.
(6) Amount subject to statutory workmen's compensation carrier's lien.
N.Y. WoRnxEN's Comp. LAw § 29 (1).
(7) Incremental recovery obtained from insured tort-feasor; MVAIC insurer; or under MVAIC statute (after imposition of carrier's lien
where applicable).
(8) Workmen's compensation award.
(9) Recovery retained by claimant as compensation for his injuries after
all deductions and limitations.
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Here, the fact that the workmen's compensation lien is
asserted only after a deduction of attorney's fees 45 proves an
advantage to the lawyer whose client is either the victim of an
insured motorist or a "qualified" person under the MVAIC
statute. Where the claimant is an "insured" person, the initial
recovery under the Endorsement is first reduced by the amounts
paid or payable under workmen's compensation insurance, thus
leaving a much smaller sum from which the attorney can deduct
his one-third fee. Interestingly, this ultimately allows the "insured"
person to retain a substantially greater cash amount than the other
two classes of claimants. 46 However, were the carrier's lien imposed
upon the "insured" person's award in conjunction with the
Endorsement deduction, that class would recover substantially
less than the other two classes of claimants, it being economically
47
unfeasible for the "insured" to pursue his Endorsement remedy.
If the "qualified" person's recovery were held not subject to
the workmen's compensation lien, that class of persons would
still retain a far greater recovery than would the victim of a
motorist insured by a standard automobile liability48 insurance policy
or an "insured" person under the Endorsement.
It should be noted that a point will be reached where it
becomes unprofitable for a claimant to pursue his remedy against
an insured tort-feasor, the Endorsement insurer, or under the
MVAIC statute. 49 As the award of compensation benefits approaches equality with the recovery received from the tort-feasor,
the Endorsement insurer, or MVAIC, after deduction of the
attorney's fee, the incremental income the claimant would receive

§ 29 (1).
Chart B, supra note 44. Compare cols. (A), (B) & (D).

45 N.Y. WORKmEN'S COmP. LAW
46

4 Id. Compare cols. (A), (C) & (D).
48 Id. Compare cols. (A), (B)
& (E).

49 The columns and lines in Chart C signify the same categories as
in Chart B, suipra note 44. This chart compares the differences in
incremental recovery where attorney's fees are incurred as the workmen's
compensation award approaches equality with the sums recovered from
the tort-feasor, the Endorsement insurer, or from MVAIC, after deduction
of reasonable attorney's fees. The examples used are workmen's compensation awards of five, six and eight thousand dollars.
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diminishes.50 However, given the present MVAIC practice of
deducting workmen's compensation benefits and prohibiting the
CHART C

(A)

victim of
insured
motorist

(1) 10,000
(2) none
(3) 10,000
(4) (3,333)*
(5)
(6)

(B)

"insured"
person
w/o lien

(C)

(D)

"qualified"
"insured"
person
person
w/lien & deduction wilien

workmen's compensation award of $5,000

(E)
"qualified"
person
w/o lien

10,000
5,000

10,000
5,000

10,000
none

10,000
none

5,000
(1,667)*

5,000
(1,667)*

10,000
(3,333)*

10,000
(3,333)*

3,333

3,333

6,667

6,667

none
3,333
5,000
8,333

5,000

5,000

none

- 0-

1,667

6,667

5,000
5,000

5,000
6,667

5,000
11,667

workmen's compensation award of $6,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
6,000
6,000
none

10,000
none

(8)
(9)

6,667
5,000
1,667
5,000
6,667

(1)
(2)

10,000
none

(3)

10,000

(3,333)*

(1,333)*

(1,333)*

(3,333)*

(3,333)*

(5)

6,667

2,667

2,667

6,667

6,667

(7)

667

2,667

-0-

(8)

6,000

6,000

6,000

(9)

6,667

(1)

10,000

(2)

none

8,000

8,000

none

none

(3)
(4)

10,000
(3,333)*

2,000
(667)*

2,000
(667)*

10,000
(3,333)*

10,000
(3,333)*

(5)
(6)

6,667
8,000

1,333
none

1,333
8,000

6,667
8,000

6,667
none

(7)

(4)
(6)

6,000

4,000

none

4,000

6,000

10,000

6,000

10,000

none

667

6,667

6,000

6,000

8,667
6,000
6,667
workmen's compensation award of $8,000
10,000
10,000
10,000

12,667
10,000

(7)

-0-

1,333

-0-

-0-

6,667

(8)

8,000

8,000

8,000

8,000

8,000

(9)

8,000

9,333

8,000

8,000

14,667

* Rounded to the nearest dollar.

5o Chart C, supra note 49, Compare cols, (A), (B), (C) & (D), line 7.
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carrier's lien, the incremental income of the "insured" person
diminishes at a much lower rate than it does for the two classes
of claimants. 51 This is because the attorney takes his fee from
the smaller initial recovery by the "insured" as compared to a
victim of an insured motorist or a "qualified" person whose
MVAIC recovery is subject to the carrier's lien.-" Thus, the
"insured" is able to secure a greater incremental recovery than
the other classes of claimants, and his remedy under the Endorsement remains profitable at higher rates of workmen's Compensation
awards, where the remedy of the victim of an insured motorist
or "qualified" person has ceased to be profitable.5 3 Also, it can
be seen that were the "insured" person's recovery subjected to
the carrier's lien at the same time the compensation deduction
is made, that person's remedy would become unprofitable long
before that of the other classes of claimants.5 4 Finally, if the
"qualified" person's MVAIC award were held not subject to the
statutory lien, the incremental income received would not diminish,
resulting in greater ultimate recovery as the workmen's compensation award increases. 5
Another significant reason why the present solution to the
problem of equality of recovery under the MVAIC program is
unsatisfactory is that the system places the burden of recompensing the employee injured by an uninsured motorist largely on
the workmen's compensation carrier while it relieves the insurer
under the Endorsement of much of the burden of protecting the
"insured" employee who is the victim of an uninsured driver.
"Insured" persons undoubtedly comprise the largest class of persons
injured by uninsured -motorists. In each case involving an
"insured" person, the insurer is allowed by the Endorsement to
reduce its loss by the amount of workmen's compensation payments
that an "insured" party receives. In contrast, the compensation
carrier is, due to the absence of its statutory lien, unable to recoup
its loss as it would have where the employee was injured by an
insured motorist and probably where he recovers as a "qualified"
person.
Is the burden of compulsory uninsured motorist protection
falling on the proper party? The MVAIC program seems to have
been designed to bear the risk of the losses caused by uninsured
motorists. That the workmen's compensation carrier comes to

53

Id. Compare..line 7 of col. (A) with line 7 of cols. (B) & (D).

Id. Compare lines 3 & 4 of cols. (A), (B) & (D).
53
Id. Compare lines 7 & 9 of cols. (A), (B) & (D) at the $8,000 level.
54
1d. Compare col. (C), line 7 with cols. (A) & (D), line 7. See also
Chart B, supra note 44, col. (C).
55-Id. Compare line 9 of cols. (A), (B) & (E).
5
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bear this risk seems inconsistent with the legislative scheme of
MVAIC. The New York automobile liability insurers, as compulsory members of MVAIC,5 6 are part of the legislative attempt
to protect the innocent victims of the uninsured motorist, and
it is they who are paid a premium for assuming the risk of the
"insured" person's injury by an uninsured driver. Payment of
that premium is far more reflective of the risk of injury by an
uninsured driver than is payment of the premium by the employer
to the workmen's compensation carrier. Also, it is to the insurer's
advantage to participate in the MVAIC program, since a highly
possible alternative to this program would be public financing of
all uninsured automobile negligence insurance. Therefore, it would
seem that the present system has given rise to a basic inequity by
virtue of the fact that the burden of protecting victims of uninsured
motorists has, whenever workmen's compensation covers the accident, been shifted from the insurance companies who are members
of AVVAIC to the workmen's compensation carriers.
Toward an Equitable Solution
It might be contended that the adverse effect of the attorney's
contingent fee upon equality of recovery under the MVAIC
program can be eliminated by a statutory adjustment of attorneys'
fees. This proposal, however, is subject to severe criticism since
it would deprive the attorney of what has been considered reasonable compensation for his services. Also, it would do nothing to
eliminate the inequitable burden presently placed on the workmen's
compensation carrier. An alternative solution is to graduate the
level of attorneys' fees where the client is an "insured." Although
this would remove the discrepancy between his recovery and that
of the other two classes of claimants, such a remedy is even
more objectionable than the first. It would mean a reduction of
the injured person's recovery without alleviating the burden placed
on the compensation carrier by the lack of its statutory lien.
The only parties who would benefit from this proposal would be
the attorneys whose clients are "insured" persons.
It is urged that the means of achieving basic equality of
recovery, eliminating the adverse effect of attorneys' fees and
placing the burden of uninsured motorist protection where the
legislature intended it to fall are: (1) eliminating those provisions of the Endorsement which authorize deduction of workmen's
compensation benefits and prohibit an Endorsement award from
being subject to a statutory workmen's compensation lien, and
(2) imposing the worlanen's compensation lien on the MVAIC
'G N.Y. INs. LAW § 602.
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awards to both "insured" and "qualified" persons. 57 Eliminating
the deduction and anti-lien provisions of the Endorsement and
imposing the statutory lien on the "insured" person's recovery
would place the "insured" in exactly the same position he would
have been in had he been injured by an insured motorist. No
deduction for workmen's compensation payments would be made.
Thus, the attorney would take his fee out of the standard
recovery, as is the case where his client is a "qualified" person
or the victim of an insured motorist covered by a standard
automobile liability insurance policy. The insurer, under the
57 Chart D assumes the same facts as did Chart B, stpra note 44.
Under the proposed solution to equality of recovery under the MVAIC
program the results would be the following:
CHART D

(A)

(B)

victim of
insured
notorist

(C)

"insured"
person

"qualified"
person

(1)
(2)

10,000
none

10,000
none

10,000
none

(3)

10,000

(5)

6,667

(4)
(6)

(7)
(8)

(3,333)*

10,000

10,000

(3,333)*

(3,333)*

6,667

6,667

4,000

4,000

2,667
4,000

2,667
4,000

2,667
4,000

6,667
10,000

6,667
10,000

(9)
6,667
(10) 10,000
* Rounded to the nearest dollar.

4,000

(1) Award collectible from insured tort-feasor, under MVAIC Endorsement, or under MVAIC statute before exclusion or limitation.
(2) Amount deducted under Endorsement exclusion of workmen's compensation benefits.
(3) Initial cash award from insured tort-feasor, MVAIC Endorsement
insurer, or MVAIC.
(4) Attorney's one-third contingent fee-deducted from (3).
(5) Initial recovery after attorney's fees.
(6) Amount subject to statutory workmen's compensation carrier's lien.
N.Y. WoalmN's Come. LAW

§ 29

(1).

(7) Incremental recovery from insured tort-feasor, AMAIC insurer, or
(8)
(9)

MVAIC.

Workmen's compensation award.
Recovery retained by claimant as compensation for his injuries after
all deductions and limitations.
(10) Recovery retained if no attorney's fees incurred.
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Endorsement, would not be able to reduce its loss by the amount
paid as workmen's compensation, thus bearing the risk the
member insurers of MVAIC were intended to bear, and the
removal of the anti-lien provision and imposition of the statutory
workmen's compensation lien would enable the compensation
carrier to recoup its loss to the same extent it would where the
employee was injured by an insured motorist. Also, imposition
of the lien on the "qualified" person's award would insure treatment of that party as if he had been injured by an insured motorist.
Here too, the insurer under the Endorsement, not the compensation carrier, would bear the risk of claims arising out of accidents
caused by uninsured motorists. Thus, there would be basic equality
of recovery and elimination of the undesirable effect of attorneys'
fees while the risk of accidents caused by uninsured motorists
in New York would fall squarely upon MVAIC and not upon
the workmen's compensation carriers.58
One part of this proposed solution could be implemented by
the courts alone. When a New York court is confronted with
the question of whether a "qualified" person's MVAIC award, is
subject to the statutory workmen's compensation lien, an affirmative
answer should be given. However, any attempt to judicially
implement the rest of the proposed solution would meet with
several obstacles. It could be argued that the Miller rationale
prevents the compensation carrier's lien from attaching to an
"insured" person's award under the Endorsement. As has been
pointed out, this obstacle is apparently surmountable since the
"contractual immunity" argument appears to be of doubtful validity
in the context of the present MVAIC program. A second obstacle
which would have to be faced is the Durant decision holding the
Endorsement's deduction provision valid. This provision itself
is inconsistent with a statutory workmen's compensation lien since
it would mean that the lien, if imposed, would only serve to
further reduce the "insured" person's ultimate recovery, thus
frustrating the purpose of the MVAIC program. Therefore, this
decision would discourage a court which desired to impose the
53 It should be noted that both the Miller and Home courts stated that
in case of any action against the uninsured tort-feasor, the subrogation
rights of the compensation carrier are superior to those of the insurer
under the uninsured motorist endorsement. Assuming that this is true
under today's MVAIC program, it does little to relieve the burden placed
upon the carrier by the present system. judgments against uninsured
motorists will most often be worthless since the tort-feasor is either
financially irresponsible or unknown. Even if the tort-feasor were to have
some assets, it is doubtful thlat the compensation carrier would be able
to recoup all its loss. Thus, the MVAIC insurer is in the favored position
of recouping nearly all his loss immediately, while the compensation carrier is left to pursue what is likely to be a futile remedy.
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lien and eliminate the deduction. Finally, the fact that there
is an Endorsement provision purporting to preclude a compensation carrier's lien would seem to foreclose the possibility of a
court fully implementing the suggested solution on its own.
However, a court, if confronted with a proper case, could suggest
to MVAIC and to the legislature that the needed changes be made.
Were MVAIC to change its policy in drafting the Endorsement,
the inequities of the present system would be removed. But
considering that MVAIC is an insurance-oriented organization and
might be reluctant to burden itself any more than it presently is,
it may well be that the legislature will have to act to eliminate the
workmen's compensation deduction and anti-lien provisions of
the MVAIC Endorsement, and possibly codify lien provisions into
the New York Workmen's Compensation or MVAIC laws.
Conclusion
The New York Legislature has chosen MVAIC as the proper
vehicle to develop a system to supplement the compulsory insurance laws by protecting the innocent victims of uninsured motorists.
The system is supported by payments made to MVAIC member
insurance companies by insured New York drivers, but its protection extends to the general citizenry of the State. Alternatively,
the legislature could have discharged its obligation to protect its
citizens by levying a uniform tax upon the population. However,
having established MVAIC, it should be its aim to make its
operation as effective and equitable as possible. The MVAIC
attempt to equalize recovery has led to inequities with respect
to attorneys' fees and workmen's compensation insurance carriers.
If the MVAIC Endorsement program is to function in an
acceptable manner, these inequities must be eliminated. The
member-insurers must assume the burdens properly imposed by
such a system if MVAIC is to continue as an acceptable vehicle
by which New York State seeks to protect its citizens from
uninsured motorists.

